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[12月15日] 数字金融Workshop

发布日期:2020-12-14 02:25    来源:

时间:12月15日12:30 - 14:00


主讲人1魏薇 北京大学国家发展研究院博士研究生 


Hong Claire Yurong, Lu Xiaomeng, and Jun Pan. 2020. FinTech Platforms and Mutual Fund Distribution. NBER Working Paper No.w26576.


This paper studies the economic impact of the emergence of FinTech platforms on financial intermediation. In China, platform distributions of mutual funds emerged in 2012 and grew quickly into a formidable presence. Utilizing the staggered fund entrance onto platforms, we find markedly increased flow sensitivities to performance. Akin to the winner-take-all phenomenon in the platform economy, net flow captured by top 10% performing funds more than triples its pre-platform level. This pattern of platform-induced performance chasing is further confirmed using private data from Howbuy, a top platform in China. Consistent with this added incentive of becoming top performers in the era of large-scale platforms, fund managers increase risk taking to enhance the probability of becoming top performers. Meanwhile, organizational cohesiveness of fund families weakens as platforms level the playing field for all funds.

主讲人2王逸鸣 北京大学国家发展研究院硕士研究生 


Buchak Greg, Matvos Gregor, Piskorski Tomasz, and Amit Seru. 2018. Fintech, regulatory arbitrage, and the rise of shadow banks. Journal of Financial Economics, 130(3), 453-483.


Shadow bank market share in residential mortgage origination nearly doubled from 2007 to 2015, with particularly dramatic growth among online “fintech” lenders. We study how two forces, regulatory differences and technological advantages, contributed to this growth. Difference in difference tests exploiting geographical heterogeneity induced by four specific increases in regulatory burden–capital requirements, mortgage servicing rights, mortgage-related lawsuits, and the movement of supervision to Office of Comptroller and Currency following closure of the Office of Thrift Supervision–all reveal that traditional banks contracted in markets where they faced more regulatory constraints; shadow banks partially filled these gaps. Relative to other shadow banks, fintech lenders serve more creditworthy borrowers and are more active in the refinancing market. Fintech lenders charge a premium of 14–16 basis points and appear to provide convenience rather than cost savings to borrowers. They seem to use different information to set interest rates relative to other lenders. A quantitative model of mortgage lending suggests that regulation accounts for roughly 60% of shadow bank growth, while technology accounts for roughly 30%.