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sidenav header background[1月9日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2020-01-06 11:39 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Search for Bidders by a Deadline
时 间：2020年01月09日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人：李志赟 （杜伦大学）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Search for Bidders by a Deadline
摘 要：
Empirical evidence shows that the dominant selling process in many markets, such as M&As, is not competitive. This paper provides a possible explanation for this puzzle, by modelling it as a seller's sequential search for bidders by a finite deadline. We show that the seller's optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequential search auction, which is characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensities (sample sizes) over time. These monotonicity results are robust in both cases of long-lived and short-lived bidders, yet a seller with short-lived bidders sets lower reserve prices and searches more intensively. We further examine the efficient search auction, and show that it has both lower reserve prices and search intensities than the optimal search auction. Therefore, the inefficiency of an optimal search auction can stem from its inefficient search rule.
主讲人介绍：
李志赟，2012年获牛津大学经济学博士学位，现为英国杜伦大学经济学助教授，研究领域主要为应用微观理论、产业组织和中国经济，论文发表于Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Comparative Economics, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advance)等期刊，中文发表于经济研究（总引用数3000+）、经济学季刊。并有论文在Economic Journal修改复投中。
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首页
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[1月9日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2020-01-06 11:39 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Search for Bidders by a Deadline
时 间：2020年01月09日（周四）10:30 -- 12:00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人：李志赟 （杜伦大学）
组织人：汪浩 胡岠 胡涛 吴泽南
题 目：Search for Bidders by a Deadline
摘 要：
Empirical evidence shows that the dominant selling process in many markets, such as M&As, is not competitive. This paper provides a possible explanation for this puzzle, by modelling it as a seller's sequential search for bidders by a finite deadline. We show that the seller's optimal search outcomes can be implemented by a sequential search auction, which is characterized by declining reserve prices and increasing search intensities (sample sizes) over time. These monotonicity results are robust in both cases of long-lived and short-lived bidders, yet a seller with short-lived bidders sets lower reserve prices and searches more intensively. We further examine the efficient search auction, and show that it has both lower reserve prices and search intensities than the optimal search auction. Therefore, the inefficiency of an optimal search auction can stem from its inefficient search rule.
主讲人介绍：
李志赟，2012年获牛津大学经济学博士学位，现为英国杜伦大学经济学助教授，研究领域主要为应用微观理论、产业组织和中国经济，论文发表于Social Choice and Welfare, Journal of Comparative Economics, BE Journal of Theoretical Economics (Advance)等期刊，中文发表于经济研究（总引用数3000+）、经济学季刊。并有论文在Economic Journal修改复投中。
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