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sidenav header background[12月26日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-12-23 11:55 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
时 间：2019年12月26日（周四）10：30~12：00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人： Shuo Liu
组织人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
题 目： Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
摘 要： Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
主讲人介绍： 刘烁，2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位，现为北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系助理教授。目前主要研究领域为组织经济学，产业组织理论，机制设计和博弈论。研究成果发表或即将发表于Theoretical Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory等国际知名学术期刊。
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教学项目展开 / 收起
sidenav background教学项目
sidenav header background[12月26日]微观理论workshop
发布日期：2019-12-23 11:55 来源：
微观理论Workshop: Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
时 间：2019年12月26日（周四）10：30~12：00
地 点：北京大学经济学院303会议室
主讲人： Shuo Liu
组织人：胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇、汪浩、胡岠
题 目： Designing Organizations in Volatile Markets
摘 要： Multinational and multiproduct firms often experience uncertainty in the relative return of conducting activities in different markets due to, for example, exchange rate volatility or the changing prospects of different products. We study how a multi-divisional organization should optimally allocate decision-making authority to its managerial members when operating in such volatile markets. To be able to adapt its decisions to local conditions, the organization has to rely on self-interested division managers to collect and disseminate the relevant information. We show that if communication takes the form of verifiable disclosure, then centralized decision-making does not suffer from information asymmetry and it allows the headquarter of the organization to better cope with the inter-market uncertainty. However, a downside of centralization is that it can discourage information acquisition, and this negative effect is complemented by the need for coordinating the activities of different divisions. As a result, the optimality of decentralized decision-making can actually be driven by a large coordination motive.
主讲人介绍： 刘烁，2019年毕业于瑞士苏黎世大学经济系，获博士学位，现为北京大学光华管理学院应用经济系助理教授。目前主要研究领域为组织经济学，产业组织理论，机制设计和博弈论。研究成果发表或即将发表于Theoretical Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory等国际知名学术期刊。
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