摘 要：
    本文用一个简单的两期动态模型分析现行年薪制下的显性激励和隐性激励。一般认为显性激励来源于工资合约，以各种方式把经营者的行为与企业的效益联系在一起。隐性激励来源于经营者对升迁、名誉的考虑，称为“职业生涯考虑”。本文明确引入“灰色收入”作为企业经营者收入的一部分，定义广义的“职业生涯考虑”。同时，放弃了通常的完全竞争市场的假设。本文通过对现行年薪制下，经理考虑“灰色收入”时，显性激励和隐性激励的共同作用的分析，解释了如下经济现象：虽然现行的年薪制引入了显性的工资合约，但并不一定使得经理的努力程度提高，而且也不能解决灰色收入问题。

Abstract
    We analyze the explicit incentive and implicit incentive under the new salary system by a simple 2-period dynamic model. Usually, explicit incentive is introduced by wage contracts, which connect the behavior of the manager with the performance of the firm. And implicit incentive comes from manager’s concern about promotion and reputation, which is usually called “career concern”. We consider gray income as part of the manager’s income and define the generalized “career concern”. And we give up the usual assumption of completely competitive market. By analyzing the effect of explicit and implicit incentive when the manager cares about gray income under the annual salary system, we show that even explicit wage contract is introduced by the system, the manager’s first-period effort doesn’t necessarily increase and in no circumstance will the manager quit from getting semi-legal gray income.

关键词：激励、灰色收入、工资合约、职业生涯考虑

Key words: incentive, gray income, wage contract, career concern

JEL 索引: D23  D82  D83

详细内容（见文件下载1） No.C2003011