时间：4月23日（周四）10:30 a.m.-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院305

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

主讲人：Tan Gan（Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy at the London School of Economics and Political Science）

摘要：

We study a screening problem in which an agent privately knows which actions or technologies are feasible and can disclose only a subset to a principal. Once disclosed, feasible options are verifiable and their payoff consequences are publicly known, so private information concerns feasibility rather than payoffs, misreporting restricts the principal’s choices directly rather than distorting her beliefs. Assuming feasible sets are ordered by inclusion, we establish a simple characterization of the optimal mechanism, where the principal either behaves as if there is no asymmetric information or locally provides no reward for better proposals. We derive comparative statics and illustrate the framework in applications to managing persuasion, action elicitation, and production-technology elicitation.

主讲人介绍：

Tan Gan is an Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Strategy at the London School of Economics and Political Science. He received his undergraduate degree in Mathematics from Peking University in 2018 and his PhD from Yale University in 2024. He specializes in microeconomic theory, with a focus on mechanism design and information economics. His research has appeared in top journals such as the Journal of Political Economy, Journal of Economic Theory and Rand Journal of Economics, and he has work under R&R at the Review of Economic Studies.