发展政经workshop:Merit-based Recruitment and Government Performance: Evidence from Random Assignment of Administrators

发布日期:2025-04-11 12:00    来源:

讲座人信息:张晓鸣 浙江大学社会学系“新百人计划”研究员

讲座时间:2025年4月11日 周五 上午10:30-12:00

讲座地点:北京大学国家发展研究院承泽园校区249教室

讲座题目:Merit-based Recruitment and Government Performance: Evidence from Random Assignment of Administrators

内容简介:How to recruit managers is a central question for public sector organizations. Exploiting a unique random assignment of administrators to counties in imperial China, we study how merit-based recruitment of managers affects government performance in multiple tasks. Combining personnel records and administrative archival data, we find that merit-recruited administrators through civil service exams (as opposed to other non-merit-based recruitment) performed better in public goods provision and tax collection, and were more likely to be recognized for their achievements by the local public. Evidence suggests that these administrators were associated with better management of subordinates. Examining their dual role as judges, we use criminal case data to show that cases judged by merit-recruited administrators had shorter durations, indicating enhanced judicial efficiency. Finally, the performance gain is not due to advantageous family connections. We show evidence consistent with a selection of higher-quality officers. Our results highlight the importance of competitive and open recruitment as a cornerstone of effective public organizations.

张晓鸣,香港大学经管学院博士,现任浙江大学社会学系“新百人计划”研究员。研究方向为历史政治经济学、历史社会学、组织理论等。目前研究议题包括,历史时期中国的国家能力及其起源、古代官僚体系的组织学原理、中国早期复杂社会的兴起与衰落等。文章发表于American Journal of Political Science; Journal of Development Economics; Journal of Comparative Economics;  Journal of Chinese Governance; 学术月刊等期刊。

组织者:

(国家发展研究院) 李力行、席天扬、徐化愚、于航、王轩、易君健、黄清扬

(经济学院) 刘冲、吴群峰、曹光宇、年永威

(光华管理学院)张晓波、仇心诚


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