时间：3月6日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：Xianwen Shi (Professor at University of Toronto)

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目: Strategic Sampling from Manipulable Data

摘要：We study a game between a decision maker and a data manipulator. The decision maker sequentially samples data to learn a binary state (high or low), while the manipulator can distort the data at a cost. The decision maker chooses when to stop sampling and act, aiming to match the true state, while the manipulator prefers the high action regardless of the state and strategically decides when and how intensely to manipulate. In equilibrium, the decision maker adopts a deterministic stopping rule, while the manipulator initially refrains from manipulation and later randomizes between full manipulation and abstention. Manipulation consistently harms the decision maker's decision quality and payoff, though it does not always benefit the manipulator. Notably, manipulation can reverse the decision maker's preference for sampling methods: while sequential sampling is superior without manipulation, static sampling may outperform it when manipulation is possible. This finding highlights the trade-offs between efficiency and robustness in adversarial environments.

主讲人介绍：Xianwen Shi is a Professor of Economics at the University of Toronto. He is an expert in mechanism design and information design, known for his work on mechanism design without transfers, with limited commitment, with endogenous information acquisition, or with endogenous information disclosure, as well as for his work on contest design. He has published papers on leading economic journals such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, and Review of Economic Studies. His current research focuses on information disclosure and manipulation in strategic dynamic contexts.