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微观理论工作坊
发布日期:2024-12-26 12:00 来源:
微观理论工作坊
时间:12月26日(周四)10:00-11:00
地点:北京大学经济学院302
主讲人:Pak Hung Au(香港科技大学副教授)
主持老师:吴泽南,石凡奇(经院);胡岠(国发院)
参与老师:胡涛,吴泽南,石凡奇(经院);汪浩,胡岠,邢亦青(国发院);翁翕,刘烁(光华)
题目: Price Discrimination and Quality Signaling
摘要:We study the implications of adopting price discrimination when price is also a tool for signaling product quality. Specifically, a seller with uncertain quality can collect data about the consumer's value for quality, and price according to the result of information acquisition. We find that, contrary to the standard price discrimination model without the need to signal quality, both the profit and efficiency can be improved if the seller acquires less consumer information. The equilibrium information policy is shown to induce quasi-perfect price discrimination: the consumer purchases at a price equal to his valuation if and only if his valuation exceeds a cutoff above the marginal cost.
主讲人介绍:Pak Hung Au is an associate professor at the Department of Economics of the HKUST. He obtained his BA (Double Honors) in Economics and Mathematics at University of British Columbia and his PhD degree at Northwestern University. He worked at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics and Nanyang Technological University before joining HKUST. His research interests include industrial organization, contract theory, information economics and experimental economics.
微观理论工作坊
时间:12月26日(周四)11:10-12:10
地点:北京大学经济学院302
主讲人:吴庆功(香港科技大学助理教授)
主持老师:吴泽南,石凡奇(经院);胡岠(国发院)
参与老师:胡涛,吴泽南,石凡奇(经院);汪浩,胡岠,邢亦青(国发院);翁翕,刘烁(光华)
题目: Interim Strategy-proof Mechanisms
摘要:In this paper, we examine mechanism design under the criterion of interim strategy-proofness (ISP), which extends the concept of strategy-proofness to settings with interdependent values. ISP stipulates that for each agent, given her beliefs about the types of other agents, truthful reporting is always the optimal strategy, regardless of the strategies employed by others. An ISP mechanism is resilient to strategic ignorance among agents and also robust against informational ignorance regarding higher-order beliefs. In a binary voting model, we characterize the set of all ISP mechanisms and demonstrate that the flexibility of ISP mechanism design is constrained by the degree of preference interdependence in the environment. Additionally, we identify a class of mechanisms that are ISP across all environments.
主讲人介绍:Qinggong Wu is a microeconomic theorist. His recent works focus on designing simple mechanisms for complex environments. Qinggong graduated from the University of Michigan.