时间：12月19日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302

主讲人：张堃（澳大利亚昆士兰大学讲师）

主持老师：吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；胡岠（国发院）

参与老师：胡涛，吴泽南，石凡奇（经院）；汪浩，胡岠，邢亦青（国发院）；翁翕，刘烁（光华）

题目: From Design to Disclosure

摘要：This paper studies games of voluntary disclosure in which a sender discloses evidence to a receiver who then offers an allocation and transfers. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs in this setting. Our main result establishes that any payoff profile that can be achieved through information design can also be supported by an equilibrium of the disclosure game. Hence, our analysis suggests an equivalence between disclosure and design in these settings. We apply our results to monopoly pricing, bargaining over policies, and insurance markets.

主讲人介绍：张堃，澳大利亚昆士兰大学讲师，亚利桑那州立大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为信息经济学和产业组织理论，重点关注机制设计、信息传递及信息获取。