主讲人：

金威（南开大学经济学院助理教授）

主持老师：

（北大经院）莫家伟

参与老师：

（北大经院）杨汝岱、田巍、刘政文、吴群锋

（北大新结构）王歆、徐铭梽

（北大国发院）余昌华、薛思帆

时间：

2024年11月25日（周一）

10：00-11：30am

地点：

北京大学经济学院305教室

报告摘要：

This paper introduces strategic interactions into a Ricardian model where two countries optimize trade policies. In a Nash Equilibrium, we find that optimal import tariffs are zero, while export taxes rise with comparative advantage, aligning with but extending the unilateral model of Costinot et al. (2015) by allowing both countries to act strategically. Our analysis reveals that welfare gains from trade policy diminish when both countries pursue optimal policies. Surprisingly, a smaller country can benefit from Nash Equilibrium through higher export taxes in goods with technological advantages. Applying the model to agriculture, we assess welfare under autarky, free trade, Nash Equilibrium, and unilateral policy, showing that small, competitive nations can outperform free trade through strategic policy, providing insights into optimal trade policy across goods.

主讲人简介：

金威，南开大学经济学院助理教授。主要研究方向为国际贸易和国际政治经济学，已有成果发表于Management Science、Review of International Economics等期刊。