An Empirical Schumpeterian Growth Model with IPR Enforcement

主讲人：Qiugu HE

时间：9月15日（周四）14:00-15:30

Zoom会议号：841 5399 7762

Zoom会议密码：670292

摘要：

Chinese lawsuits and industry survey data suggest two facts: 1) firm average R&D expenditure is lower in the strict IPR province-industry group when market is monopolistic. 2) Firm average RD expenditure decreases in competition less significantly for the strict IPR-provinces group. To explain why this is the case, I build a Schumpeterian growth model with technology imitation, endogenous market structure, and IPR enforcement. In a weak IPR environment, imitation is an easy way for a firm to accumulate the knowledge capital needed for innovation. However, such knowledge capital is easily destroyed when facing competition. I estimate the model and find that approximately three-quarters of knowledge capital is formed by imitation. I quantify the general equilibrium and find: 1) weak IPR policy promotes aggregate innovation through knowledge diffusion. 2) An R&D subsidy policy does not significantly improve a firm’s average innovation under weak IPR, because it also encourages firms to imitate to obtain knowledge capital for the R&D subsidy.

主讲人介绍：

Qiugu He is an assitant professor at the School of Economics at Nankai University. He received a Ph.D. degree in Economics from Singapore Management University, a master degree in software engineering from Peking University, and a B.A. degree in software engineering from the Central South University. His research interests lie in International trade, Macroeconomic Growth, and Industrial Organization.