Observational Learning with Ordered States

主讲人: Navin Kartik (Professor, Columbia University)

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

时间：2022年5月26日（周四）9:30-11:00

地点：ZOOM会议（会议号附在文末）

报告摘要：

When does society eventually learn the truth, or underlying state, via observational learning? In a general model of sequential learning over networks, we develop the interplay of preferences satisfying single-crossing differences (SCD) and a new informational condition, directionally unbounded beliefs (DUB). For a wide class of social network structures, SCD preferences and DUB information are a minimal pair of sufficient conditions for learning. Unlike “unbounded beliefs”, which is the informational condition that characterizes learning for all preferences, DUB is compatible with the monotone likelihood ratio property. More broadly, we establish that for arbitrary preferences and information, there is “information diffusion”.

主讲人简介：

Navin Kartik is Professor of Economics at Columbia University. His main areas of research are in microeconomic theory and political economy, specifically on topics in game theory and information economics. He received his B.A. in Economics and Mathematics from Brandeis University in 1999 and his Ph.D. in Economics from Stanford University in 2004. Prior to joining Columbia in 2008, he was on the faculty of UC San Diego. He has been a visitor at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, and Yale University. In 2010, he was awarded a Sloan Research Fellowship by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation "to stimulate fundamental research by early-career scientists and scholars of outstanding promise". He has received multiple grants from the National Science Foundation, and multiple teaching and Ph.D. advising awards. His research has been published by the best economics journals such as the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the Journal of Political Economy, and the Review of Economic Studies. He currently serves on the editorial boards of a number of journals, including the American Economic Review and the Review of Economic Studies.

会议号：841 3962 1974

密码：276501