Information Revelation and Signaling in Elimination Contests

主讲人: 王汝渠 (浙江大学经济学院教授)

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

时间：2022年4月7日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：ZOOM会议（会议号附在文末）

报告摘要：

This seminar contains two related papers in elimination contests. In the first paper, we focus on contests in the form of all-pay auctions. We investigate how information revelation rules affect the existence and the efficiency of equilibria in two-round elimination contests. We establish that no symmetric separating equilibrium exists under the full revelation rule and find that the non-existence result is very robust. We then characterize a partially efficient separating equilibrium under the partial revelation rule when player valuations are uniformly distributed. We finally investigate the no revelation rule and find that it is both most efficient and optimal in maximizing the total efforts from the contestants. Within our framework, more information revelation leads to less efficient outcomes.In the second paper, we examine the signaling effect in a two-round elimination general Tullock contests. Efforts in the first round are observed by all players and can signal players' private information which is useful in the second round contest. When the second round contest sensitivity is higher than a cutoff, there exists no completely separating equilibrium; when it is lower than the cutoff, then under some regularity conditions, the equilibrium is completely separating. Comparing to the benchmark model where private information automatically becomes common knowledge right before the start of the second round, strong players would over-bid and weak players would under-bid; the presence of signaling effect causes the first round bidding function steeper for high valuations and flatter for low valuations.

主讲人简介：

王汝渠教授是加拿大皇后大学经济系约翰·麦克唐纳爵士终身教授，浙江大学经济学院教授，浙江大学马斯金中国经济发展研究中心主任。1985年复旦大学数学系本科毕业，1990年美国波士顿大学经济学博士毕业。1990年起在加拿大皇后大学经济系任助理教授，1996年升为终身副教授，2001年升为约翰·麦克唐纳爵士终身教授，其间做客美国西北大学和新加坡国立大学各一年，并在2003至2004年间任美国科罗拉多大学终身教授一年。2008年入选教育部“长江学者”讲座教授后任职于浙江大学，并在清华大学兼职中国建设银行讲座教授三年。

王汝渠教授长期从事信息经济学方面的研究，在拍卖理论、竞赛理论、机制设计等研究中取得成果，并在《American Economic Review》、《Journal of Economic Theory》、《Games and Economic Behavior》等经济学期刊上发表。目前在浙江大学与数位青年教师组成科研团队，研究中国经济中的博弈问题，其中包括航空业的发展和飞行员的供需平衡，中国稀土的开采和保护战略，产业链和产业结构等等。

会议号：821 5017 2810

密码：198120