The Return of Greenspan: Mumbling with Great Incoherence

主讲人：欧声亮（上海财经大学高等研究院）

时间：2022年3月25日 上午10:00-11:30

地点：加入Zoom会议

https://us02web.zoom.us/j/81564674921?pwd=ZzgxcGpZNVJQTDJ5YzlHKzNEaXJVdz09

会议号：815 6467 4921

密码：307503

摘要：The conventional wisdom views a reduced aggregate noise as welfare improving. This paper demonstrates that increased transparency regarding the unobserved state of the economy might reduce social welfare due to the presence of nominal rigidity, which gives rise to costly price dispersions. On the one hand, business cycle fluctuations and price dispersions arising from nominal rigidity are muted in a noisy economy. On the other hand, an economy with less transparency suffers from efficiency losses due to inefficient coordination in production and pricing decisions. The optimal central bank communication balances the gain from increased efficiency with the cost of higher price dispersions due to nominal rigidity. Monetary policy affects the tradeoff, and thus interacts with the communication policy. We characterize the conditions under which a more transparent central bank communication reduces social welfare. A dynamic quantitative model demonstrates that a central bank that mumbles with great incoherence is optimal.

个人简介：

欧声亮，上海财经大学高等研究院助理教授，博士毕业于庞培法布拉大学，主要研究领域为宏观经济学与货币经济学，研究成果发表在Journal of Monetary Economics等学术期刊，主持国家自然科学基金等研究项目。