Dynamic Screening with Verifiable Bankruptcy

主讲人: Daniel Krähmer (Professor, University of Bonn)

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

时间：2022年3月17日（周四）16:30-18:00

地点：ZOOM会议（会议号附在文末）

报告摘要：

We consider bankruptcy constraints in a standard dynamic screening model. We model bankruptcy as a verifiable event that occurs whenever the agent makes a per period loss. This gives rise to less stringent truth-telling constraints, as misreports become verifiable if they force the agent into bankruptcy. We solve for an optimal contract using a new method that ranks contracts in terms of the spread of the distribution of the induced continuation values for the agent. In a setting with continuous types, we derive a regularity condition that ensure that the optimal contract is deterministic.

主讲人简介：

Krähmer got his PhD at the Free University Berlin in 2003. After postdoc positions in London (UCL) and Berlin (Free University), he joined the Economics Department at the University of Bonn in 2008 where he is full professor since 2011. Krähmer's research interests are microeconomic theory, especially contract theory, mechanism design, information design, and behavioral industrial organization.

会议号：823 1434 4179

会议密码：675616