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sidenav header background[12月8日]发展和政治经济学workshop
发布日期：2021-12-07 10:49 来源：
Path Dependence in Policy Transmission时间：12月8日14:00-15:30地点：承泽园246教室主持人：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、张晓波，（经济学院）刘冲主讲人：张英广，北京大学光华管理学院金融学系助理教授(合作者：胡佳胤）摘要：The policy agenda set by the central government relies on the implementation by local governments. We depict how this policy transmission mechanism works using textual analysis on central and local government working reports. We find that policy paths exhibit a history-dependency that manifests into a cohort effect: local officials who take office in the same year focus on a similar set of policies that are uniquely related to the central government policies around their appointed years. Our results suggest that (1) local governors’ policy path is largely shaped by the economic and political conditions in their initial years, and (2) central economic policies transmit better with newly appointed officials, especially when the new local official comes from a provincial, rather than a local, government institution. We find supporting evidence when applying our policy path dependence theory to the Supply-Side Structural Reform episode starting from 2015.
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sidenav header background[12月8日]发展和政治经济学workshop
发布日期：2021-12-07 10:49 来源：
Path Dependence in Policy Transmission时间：12月8日14:00-15:30地点：承泽园246教室主持人：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、张晓波，（经济学院）刘冲主讲人：张英广，北京大学光华管理学院金融学系助理教授(合作者：胡佳胤）摘要：The policy agenda set by the central government relies on the implementation by local governments. We depict how this policy transmission mechanism works using textual analysis on central and local government working reports. We find that policy paths exhibit a history-dependency that manifests into a cohort effect: local officials who take office in the same year focus on a similar set of policies that are uniquely related to the central government policies around their appointed years. Our results suggest that (1) local governors’ policy path is largely shaped by the economic and political conditions in their initial years, and (2) central economic policies transmit better with newly appointed officials, especially when the new local official comes from a provincial, rather than a local, government institution. We find supporting evidence when applying our policy path dependence theory to the Supply-Side Structural Reform episode starting from 2015.
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