Do Safety Inspections Improve Safety? Evidence from the Roadside Inspection Program for Commercial Vehicles

时间：11月24日14:00-15:30

地点：承泽园246教室

主讲人: 梁远宁

主持人：（国发院）李力行、席天扬、张晓波，（经济学院）刘冲

摘要：Regulatory efforts to reduce public hazards could be undermined when agents respond strategically to enforcement. This paper quantifies changes in US road safety from a nationwide truck inspection regulation using comprehensive data on inspections and accidents. I show that there is a sharp increase in the truck’s accident rate immediately following an inspection, which aggregates to 1,803 additional accidents per year. These accidents are caused by reduced caution in driving from recently inspected drivers, such as speeding and less maintenance, as regulators rarely conduct repeated inspections. Policy comparisons show that less predictable inspection schedules and practices could reduce accidents.

Bio:

I'm an Assistant Professor in the School of Economics at Peking University. My areas of specialization are environmental, transportation, urban economics, and biodiversity. My research focuses on advancing understanding of the impacts of regulatory enforcement and compliance in both domestic and international settings. I received my PhD from the Dyson School of Applied Economics and Management at Cornell University.

More about my research on my website: https://www.yuanning-liang.com