主讲人: Yeon-Koo Che (Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory, Columbia University)

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

题目: Keeping the Listener Engaged: A Dynamic Model of Bayesian Persuasion

作者：Yeon-Koo Ch，Kyungmin (Teddy) Kim and Konrad Mierendorff

时间：2021年4月1日（周四）10:00-11:30

地点：线上（会议号附在文末）

报告摘要：

We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally collapse in a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) of this game. However, for persuasion costs sufficiently small, a version of a folk theorem holds: outcomes that approximate Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)’s sender-optimal persuasion as well as full revelation and everything in between are obtained in MPE, as the cost vanishes.

主讲人简介：

Yeon-Koo Che is Kelvin J. Lancaster Professor of Economic Theory at Columbia University. His early works contribute to the theory of mechanism and auction design: scoring-rule auctions, auctions with budget constraints, collusion-proof mechanism design, incomplete contracts, and matching theory.  His current research projects explore the implications of data-driven economic decision-making and resource allocation for welfare and distributional consequences.  He is a Fellow of Econometric Society (elected 2009) and a Fellow of Economic Theory (elected 2014). He was an editor of Journal of Industrial Economics, an associate editor of Econometrica, and currently an advisory editor of Games and Economic Behavior.  He has received 9 National Science Foundation grants and has published over 50 articles in leading economics journals, such as American Economic Review, Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Review of Economic Studies.

形式：ZOOM会议

会议号：966 5220 5370

密码：258024