Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences

主讲人: 刘知微（首都经贸大学经济学院副教授）

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

题目: Persuasion in an asymmetric information economy: a justification of Wald's maxmin preferences

时间：2020年11月19日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302教室

   报告摘要：

To justify the use of Wald's maxmin preferences in an asymmetric information economy, we introduce a mechanism designer who can convince/persuade agents to adopt Wald's maxmin preferences. We show that more allocations become incentive compatible if the mechanism designer persuades the agents to use Wald's maxmin preferences instead of Bayesian preferences. Thus, we justify the use of the Wald's maxmin preferences by showing that agents can be persuaded to use them in order to enlarge the set of incentive compatible allocations.

主讲人简介：

刘知微，美国伊利诺伊大学（Urbana-Champaign）经济学博士。现任首都经济贸易大学国际经济管理学院副教授。主要研究方向为微观经济理论，涉及整体均衡，博弈论，机制设计等理论。论文发表在《Games and Economic Behavior》， 《Economic Theory》，《Journal of Mathematical Economics》和《 Economic Theory Bulletin》。主持国家自然科学基金青年科学基金项目《缓解城市高峰时段交通拥挤的社会与个人双赢博弈机制设计研究》, 2018年-2020年。

Zhiwei Liu pursued graduate studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign where she obtained her PhD in economics. She is currently an associate professor at the International School of Economics and Management, Capital University of Economics and Business. Her current research is focused on Microeconomic theory: general equilibrium, game theory with asymmetric information, and mechanism design. Her papers were published in《Games and Economic Behavior》,《 Economic Theory》, 《Journal of Mathematical Economics》, and《 Economic Theory Bulletin》.