题目1: Optimal pricing schemes in the presence of social learning and costly reporting

题目2: Screening with public information disclosure

主讲人: 张凯伟（北京大学元培学院本科生）、张雨桐（北京大学元培学院本科生）

主持老师: （经院）吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）胡岠

参与老师: （经院）胡涛、吴泽南、石凡奇；（国发院）汪浩、胡岠

时间：2020年10月22日（周四）10:30-12:00

地点：北京大学经济学院302教室

题目1: Optimal pricing schemes in the presence of social learning and costly reporting

 报告摘要：

We study a monopoly’s optimal mechanism design problem in which consumers each arrive sequentially and choose one of binary actions consisting of an arm with unknown utility. Both the monopoly platform and the subsequent consumers learn from the consumer feedback, but providing feedback is costly and hence the platform has to offer bonus to motivate feedback. We characterize the optimal bonus scheme together with the optimal pricing scheme of the platform whose goal is to maximize the profit. There are four types of scheme in total: Full Coverage, Partial Coverage, Immediate Revelation and No Bonus. Discriminators among each scheme reveal trade-off that the platform faces in the optimal design.

 主讲人简介：

张凯伟，北京大学元培学院数学方向本科生，经济学双学位在读，主要学习方向为微观经济理论，涉及信息经济学、机制设计、委托代理理论等话题。

题目2: Screening with public information disclosure

报告摘要：

We study a model in which a monopolist (she) has multiple items for sale to a unit-demand buyer (he) with private information and she designs the selling mechanism and the public information disclosure rule to maximize her expected revenue. We find out that, the optimal mechanism resembles a recommendation mechanism: upon receiving each signal, the buyer knows which one of the items is of the highest quality realization and is persuaded into buying this item if his type exceeds the cutoff level.

主讲人简介：

张雨桐，北京大学元培学院2017级经济方向本科生，主要学习方向为微观经济理论。