Time: May 30, 2019 (Thursday) 10:00-11:30

　　Location: Zhengda International Center 301 Room (正大国际中心/勺园，三层301室), Peking University

　　Speaker: Dr. Yiqing Xing

　　Screening with Network Externalities 

　　Abstract

　　Increasingly many products feature “network externalities”: the utility of one’s consumption increases in her neighbors’ consumptions. Although information of network structure is important to the seller, it is often privately known to the buyers. We model a monopoly’s (constrained) optimal pricing strategy to “screen” buyer’s network information: their susceptibility (out-degree) and influence (in-degree). We characterize the optimal allocation for both the case of directed networks where each buyer’s influence and susceptibility are independent, and the case of undirected networks where the two are identical. For directed networks, we show the optimal allocation can only depend on a buyer’s susceptibility and is linear in virtual type (of susceptibility) with quadratic intrinsic value. For undirected networks, we disentangle the different effects of influence and susceptibility on optimal allocation and show that with quadratic intrinsic value, the allocation is a linear combination of a buyer’s type and virtual type. We contrast the analysis with two benchmarks, the complete information pricing and uniform pricing, to shed light on the value of network information. 

　　About the Speaker

　　Dr Yiqing Xing is an Assistant Professor of Economics at Johns Hopkins University, Carey Business School. He received a B.S. in mathematics, a B.A. and an M.A. in economics (CCER, NSD) in Peking University, as well as a PhD in economics from Stanford University. His research interests include social and economic networks, microeconomic theory, development economics, and political economy. His research has been published in journals such as Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences (PNAS), Economics Letters, Economic Research Journal, etc.