GAME THEORY SOCIETY

GAMES 2024
PEKING UNIVERSITY
AUGUST 19-22, BEIJING

北京大学国家发展研究院
National School of Development

30th Anniversary
1994-2024

2024 第七届世界博弈论大会

The 7th World Congress of the Game Theory Society

August 19-22, Beijing

Conference Handbook

1. Miscellaneous Information

Please wear your badge at all times at the Conference Venue. You will need the badge to enter the venue, get lunches and take a seat at the Conference Dinner.

Regular Sessions take place on the 1st to 4th floors. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. In case of a last-minute cancellation, do not fill the gap as this will facilitate session hopping. *Each speaker has 22 minutes to set up, speak including Q&A, and take down.*

Semi-plenary Sessions take place in B101, 420 and 429. The last speaker in the session is the session chair. It is very important that you ensure the session starts and ends at the correct time. *Each speaker has 45 minutes to set up, speak and take down.*

Keynote Speeches take place in B101. There will be volunteers with microphones in the audience to catch questions. *Each keynote speech lasts for 60 minutes.*

Lunch boxes/bags are offered on Floor B1. There are three lunch areas: B1 Canteen with 200 seats, B106 with 60 seats, and an open space in B1 with 90 seats. There is a large outdoor space in front of the building and feel free to take your boxed lunch there. *Your help in placing rubbish in the appropriate place is greatly appreciated.*

Information about the program and last-minute changes will be displayed on the monitors close to the Information Desk on the 1st floor, outside the classrooms, and next to the elevators.

If you need a place to keep a bag or two, contact the Information Desk.

If you would like to connect wirelessly to the internet, see instructions in "4. Service" of this handbook.

Timetable of shuttle bus between the Conference Venue and The Lakeview Hotel, which also holds the Conference Dinner on August 20th, is included in "4. Service" of this handbook. The timetable is also posted near the Information Desk.

2. Registration & Program

a) Registration

For participants arriving and/or registering on August 19th: please plan to arrive early as the opening ceremony starts at 9 am. You may first come to the opening ceremony and speeches before picking up your conference package.

For participants who reserved a room at either hotel designated in the registration system: your conference package will be kept at your hotel on August 18th and 19th for two days for you to pick up, and then moved to the Conference Venue from August 20th.

On-site registration and payment are available in registration service hours on August 18 to 20 at the Conference Venue.

Registration Service Timetable

Date	National School of Development, Peking University	The Lakeview Hotel	Beijing Post & Telecommunications Conference Center
August 18th	12:00-18:00	12:00-22:00	12:00-22:00
August 19th	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00	07:30-18:00
August 20th-22nd	08:00-18:00	-	-
Notes	*The Conference Venue at the Chengze Garden*	*For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system*	*For those who reserved a room at this hotel in registration system*

B) Program Overview

August 19th		August 20th		August 21st		August 22nd	
09:00 - 09:30	Opening Ceremony and Group Photo	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 3	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 6	09:00 - 10:30	Regular Sessions 9
09:35 - 10:35	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk)						
11:00 - 12:10	Regular Sessions 1	11:00 - 12:00	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture)	11:00 - 12:30	Semi-plenary Sessions	11:00 - 12:00	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk)
12:10 - 13:30	Lunch	12:00 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch	12:30 - 13:30	Lunch
13:30 - 15:00	Semi-plenary Sessions	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 4	13:30 - 14:40	Regular Sessions 7	13:30 - 15:00	Regular Sessions 10
15:30 - 16:40	Regular Sessions 2	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 5	15:10 - 16:20	Regular Sessions 8	15:30 - 17:00	Regular Sessions 11
17:10 - 18:40	Panel Discussions	16:40 - 17:40	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture)	16:40 - 17:40	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture)		
		18:30 - 20:30	Conference Dinner (Lakeview Hotel)				

Opening Ceremony (B101)

Aug. 19 9:00 – 9:30

Welcome remarks by

- Guohua Jiang, vice president of Peking University
- Matthew Jackson, former president, the Game Theory Society
- Michihiro Kandori, president, the Game Theory Society
- Gabrielle Demange, president-elect, the Game Theory Society
- Yiping Huang, dean of National School of Development, Peking University

Chaired by Xiaoyan Lei, chair of the Academic Board of National School of Development, Peking University

Group photo

Keynotes (B101)

Aug. 19 09:35 - 10:35	Michihiro Kandori (President's Talk) University of Tokyo	How to Use AI for Game Theoretic Research
Aug. 20 11:00 - 12:00	Nisarg Shah (Kalai Prize Lecture) University of Toronto	The Unreasonable Fairness of Maximum Nash Welfare
Aug. 20 16:40 - 17:40	Ariel Rubinstein (Morgenstern Lecture) Tel Aviv University and New York University	No Prices, No Games: The Case of Matching Problems
Aug. 21 16:40 - 17:40	Françoise Forges (von Neumann Lecture) Paris Dauphine-PSL University	On Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
Aug. 22 11:00 - 12:00	Gabrielle Demange (President-Elect's Talk) Paris School of Economics	Dual Communication in a Social Network: Contributing and Dedicating Attention

Semi-plenary Talks

Aug. 19 13:30 - 15:00

B101	Yan Chen University of Michigan	Group Identity and Belief Formation: A Decomposition of Political Polarization
	Anton Kolotilin University of New South Wales	The Economics of Partisan Gerrymandering
420	Takuo Sugaya Stanford University	Non-Recursive Dynamic Incentives: A Rate of Convergence Approach
	Ning Yu Nanjing Audit University	Real-Time Games

Aug. 21 11:00-12:30

B101	Itai Ashlagi Stanford University	TBD
	Yeneng Sun National University of Singapore	Coarser Information in Games
420	Andreas Blume University of Arizona	Language Games: Correlation through Non-Understanding, Dialogue, Inarticulateness, and Misunderstanding
	Itai Arieli Technion-lsrael Institute of Technology	Persuading while Learning
429	Ingela Alger Toulouse School of Economics	Evolutionary Foundations of Human Motivation in Strategic Interactions —Recent Advances

Regular Sessions

1. Aug. 19 11:00 – 12:10

131	**Networks I**	
	Strategic Diffusion: Public Goods vs. Public Bads	Arthur Campbell, DJ Thornton, Yves Zenou*
	Interconnected Conflict	Marcin Dziubiński, Sanjeev Goyal, Junjie Zhou*
	Robust Katz Centrality	Yang Sun, Wei Zhao*, Junjie Zhou

132	**Assignment I**	
	Fair and Strategy-proof Probabilistic Allocation with Payment	Zheng Lin*, Tsuyoshi Adachi
	On (constrained) efficiency of strategy-proof random assignment	Christian Basteck*, Lars Ehlers
	Affirmative Action's Cumulative Fractional Assignments	Manshu Khanna*, Haydar Evren

245	**Bargaining I**	
	Bargaining with Mechanisms: Two-sided Incomplete Information	Marcin Peski*
	U-shaped settlement pattern in bargaining with arbitration	Zhixian Yu*
	Decentralized Multilateral Bargaining	Yuan Ju, Juan Vidal-Puga*

246	**Contracts I**	
	Designing Index Provision	Yizhou Xiao*, Yan Xiong
	Rethinking the Incentive Dilemma: Crafting Ambiguous Strategies for Indirectly Linking between Employee Behavior and Value Creation	Zhenghao Xia*, Jinghua Xiao
	Selling Training Data	Jingmin Huang, Wei Zhao, Renjie Zhong*

249	**Persuasion I**	
	Managing Persuasion Robustly: The Optimality of Quota Rules	Dirk Bergemann, Tan Gan*, Yingkai Li
	Industry-optimal quality disclosure	Ming Li*, Binyan Pu
	Robust Advertisement Pricing	Tan Gan, Hongcheng Li*

344	**Evolution I**	
	Partner Choice and Morality: Preference Evolution under Stable Matching	Ziwei Wang*, Jiabin Wu
	Costly Advertising and Information Congestion: Insights from Pigou's Successors	Ryoji Jinushi*
	Dynamics of Cournot and Bertrand Firms: Exploring Imitation and Replicator Processes	Hsiao-Chi Chen*, Yunshyong Chow, Shi-Miin Liu

345	**Industrial Organization I**	
	Popularity in location games	Gaetan Fournier, Marc Schroder*
	Data Asset Utilization and Transaction Value Allocation	Jinghua Xiao, Chenghao Zhang*, Kang Xie, Zhigang Cao
	The Competitive Effects of Fixed-Price Contracts under Cost Inflation	Luke Garrod, Ruochen Li*, Chris Wilson

429	**Learning I**	
	Contracts that Reward Innovation: Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal	Yiman Sun*
	Optimal Incentives for Innovation Adoption	Wanyi Chen, Qiaoxi Zhang*
	Learning through Transient Matching in Congested Markets	Andrew Ferdowsian*

2. Aug. 19 15:30 - 16:40

131   Networks II
Influencer Networks   Xueheng Li*

Strategic Hiding and Exploration in Networks   Francis Bloch, Bhaskar Dutta, Marcin Dziubiński*

Sequential Network Design   Yang Sun*, Wei Zhao, Junjie Zhou

132   Experiments I
Goose Feather from a Thousand Miles Away: A Theory and Experiment on Reciprocity   Yunwen He, Jaimie Lien, Yang Yang*, Jie Zheng

Credible Threats   Martin Dufwenberg, Flora Li*, Alec Smith

Transparency and Verifiability in Communication with Endogenous Information Acquisition   Ernest Lai,* Wooyoung Lim, Yichuan Lou

245   Extensive Form
Extended backward induction and sequential equilibria   Evgeny Zalyubovsky*

Monotonicity and Robust Implementation Under Forward-Induction Reasoning   Emiliano Catonini*, Pierpaolo Battigalli

Local dominance   Emiliano Catonini, Jingyi Xue*

246   Industrial Organization II
Multi-dimensional Personalized Pricing and Market Competition   Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu*, Yuxuan Zhu

Secrecy vs. Patenting in Innovation Races   Pavel Kocourek*, Eugen Kovac

Efficient Equilibrium Selection in Entry (Global) Games   Pedro Jara-Moroni*, Rabah Amir, Rodrigo Harrison

249   Mechanism Design I
Robustly Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading   Wanchang Zhang*

Optimal mechanism for selling multiple items to a unit-demand buyer   Keita Kuwahara, Reo Nonaka*

Strategy-proof Social Choice Functions over Restricted Domains: Possibility, Impossibility and Top-inseparability   Abhinaba Lahiri*, Anup Pramanik

344   Persuasion II
Rationality-Robust Information Design: Bayesian Persuasion under Quantal Response   Yiding Feng, Chien-Ju Ho, Wei Tang*

Hierarchical Bayesian Persuasion   Zhonghong Kuang, Jaimie W Lien*, Jie Zheng

Revenue-Maximizing Overselling in Markets with Asymmetric Information   Fan Wu, Jie Zheng*

345   Cooperative Games I
Comparative Statics of Minimum-Cost-Spanning-Tree Games   Zhibin Tan*, Zhigang Cao, Zhengxing Zou

Coalitional Manipulations and Immunity of the Shapley Value   Christian Basteck, Frank Huettner*

Veto core consistent voting rules   Aleksei Kondratev*

429   Learning II
Learning from Strategic Sources   Kailin Chen*

The Effect of State Correlation and Payoff Interdependence on R&D   Tatiana Mayskaya*, Arina Nikandrova

Emergence of Cooperative Nash-Equilibria from Competitive Decision-Making Games   Yilong Feng*, Boyu Zhang, Wenjun Mei

3. Aug. 20 9:00 - 10:30

131   Models of Political Agency

Governing Local Bureaucracy in a Centralized State	Zanhui Liu, Zhaotian Luo*, Yucheng Qiu, Tianyang Xi, Hongding Zhu
Decay of Long-established Democracies	Weijia Li, Yang Xie*
An Organizational Theory of Political Parties	Spencer Pantoja*
Reputational Concern and Policy Vagueness	Chen Cheng*, Liuchun Deng, Yufeng Sun

132   Networks III

Persuasion in Networks: Can the Sender Do Better than Using Public Signals?	Yifan Zhang*
Information Sale on Network	Jihwan Do, Lining Han*, Xiaoxi Li
Link complementarity and social coordination	Zhiwei Cui*
Heterogeneous Welfare Effects of Public Information	Kota Murayama*

245   Auctions I

Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets	Runxi Wang*, Karl-Martin Ehrhart, Anselm Eicke, ..., Ingmar Schlecht
A Simple Model of Trading Artworks	Min Zhang*
A Method to Characterize Reduced-Form Auctions	Charles Zheng*
Auction design with ambiguity:Optimality of the first-price and all-pay auctions	Sosung Baik, Sung-Ha Hwang*

246   Communication I

Facilitating trust and trustworthiness: The impact of mediation	Saori Chiba, Michiko Ogaku*
Bayesian communication games with information networks	Xiao Luo, Yongchuan Qiao*, Yang Sun
Academic Publication Competition	Yifan Wu*
Undefeated equilibrium and better response dynamics in sender receiver games	Stéphan Sémirat*, Françoise Forges

249   Contests I

Chasing Contests	Zhuo Chen, Yun Liu*
Blotto Game with Testing (The Locks, Bombs and Testing Model)	Isaac Sonin*
Optimal Biased Design of Dynamic Multi-Battle Team Contests	Xin Feng*
Staying Afloat: On firms' sharing of their success with workers under the New Normal.	Xinyan Zhang*, Simona Fabrizi, Steffen Lippert

344   Mechanism Design II

Matching Maximization Mechanism	Anh Trieu*, Iwan Bos, Marc Schroder, Dries Vermeulen
Implementing Randomized Allocation Rules with Outcome-Contingent Transfer	Fan Wu, Yi Liu*
Robustly Optimal Voting Rule	Noriaki Kiguchi*, Shinpei Noguchi, Yuta Takahashi
Optimal allocation with costly verification and distributional constraint	Yunan Li*

345	Implementation	
	Implementation in Undominated Strategies: Dictatorship and Compromise	Saptarshi Mukherjee, Nozomu Muto*
	Implementation in VNM stable sets	Michele Lombardi*, Ville Korpela, Riccardo Saulle
	Implementing Lindahl allocations in a warm-glow economy	Xinxi Song*
	Information Size and Full Implementation	Yi-Chun Chen, Yifei Sun*

429	Incomplete Information	
	Bayesian Equilibrium and Generalized Nash Equilibrium	Christian W. Bach*, Andrés Perea
	Information Aggregation with Costly Information Acquisition	Spyros Galanis, Sergei Mikhalishchev*
	Robustness in Binary-Action Supermodular Games Revisited	Daisuke Oyama, Satoru Takahashi*
	Group Knowledge and Individual Introspection	Michele Crescenzi*

4. Aug. 20 13:30 - 14:40

131	Bargaining II	
	Negotiation in bankruptcy problems	Dirck Bouwhuis*, Ruud Hendrickx, Jean-Jacques Herings
	Orchestrating Organizational Politics: Baron and Ferejohn meet Tullock	Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu*
	The Cooperation Problem	Xiangliang Li*

132	Behavioral Economics I	
	Regret in Games	Pierpaolo Battigalli, Martin Dufwenberg, Senran Lin*
	Coordinated punishment? Only if reciprocators abound	Adriana Alventosa, Vicente Calabuig*, Gonzalo Olcina
	Venture Capital and Multiple Heterogeneous Beliefs	Zhuming Chen*, Xue Luo

245	Industrial Organization III	
	Merger, Stochastic R&D and Welfare in a Mixed Duopoly	Di Wu, Leonard F. S. Wang, Huizhong Liu*
	Bargaining power and the incentive for innovation	Jianxin Guo*
	Teamwork Frictions in the Ricardian Team Production Framework	Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, Richard Steinberg*, Oscar Volij

246	Industrial Organization IV	
	The Value of Anonymous Option	Wanzhu Zhang*, Jianpei Li
	Warm up by Revelation to Cool down in Competition: Strategic Provision of Relationship-sensitive Information	Xiaokuai Shao*, Jie Zheng
	Antitrust policy under R&D spillovers & moral hazard	Yasuhiro Shirata*

249	Evolution II	
	Algorithmic Collusion and Price Discrimination: The Over-Usage of Data	Zhang Xu*, Mingsheng Zhang, Wei Zhao
	Leadership and peer effects	Penelope Hernandez, Gonzalo Olcina*, Raul Toral
	Convergence of Fictitious Plays in Potential Games	Zibo Xu*

344	Matching I	
	Multiproduct trading of indivisible goods with many sellers and buyers	Amparo Urbano*, Iván Arribas
	A Justified-Envy Minimal Variation of the Top Trading Cycles Mechanism	Qianfeng Tang*, Jian Hong
	College admissions with program-based scholarships	Azar Abizada*, Umut Dur

345	Mechanism Design III	
	Undominated Mechanisms	Tilman Borgers, Jiangtao Li*, Kexin Wang
	A Robust Optimization Approach to Mechanism Design	Kexin Wang*, Jiangtao Li
	Incentive Compatible Mechanisms with Punishment	Lining Han, Ruben Juarez*

429	Networks IV	
	Pricing and Advertising with Network Externalities under Asymmetric Information	Litian Chen, Yaojun Nan and Fanqi Shi*
	Financial Supernetworks and Endogenous Systemic Risk	Jing Fu*, Frank Page, Jean-Pierre Zigrand
	The Network Effects of Agency Conflicts	Rakesh Vohra, Yiqing Xing*, Wu Zhu

5. Aug. 20 15:10 - 16:20

131	Decision Theory	
	Decision Making Under Multidimensional Uncertainty	Mu Zhang*, Shaowei Ke
	Failures of Contingent Thinking	Evan Piermont, Peio Zuazo-Garin*
	Conditional Hypothesis Testing Systems	Xiao Luo*

132	Epidemics	
	Optimal control in models of virus propagation	Xiuxiu Liu*, Elena Gubar
	Modified SEIQHRDP and Machine Learning Prediction for the Epidemics	Yike Li*, Gubar Elena
	The Impact of the connecting urban transportation systemto the SEIR model	Ke Ma*, Elena Gubar

245	Industrial Organization V	
	Data Trade and Consumer Privacy	Jiadong Gu*
	Potentials in Cournot Cross-holding Games	Sixian Shen*, Feng Zhu, Guopeng Li, Zhigang Cao
	How do Tom and Jerry Play? A Simple Application of Convex Analysis in Hide-and-Seek Games	Xinmi Li*, Jie Zheng

246	Monotone Comparative Statics	
	How Coordination Initiates, Diffuses and Succeeds: A Dynamic Network Game Approach	Xinnian Pan*
	The Structure of Optimisation Problems	Jose Maria Moreno de Guerra Beato*
	Comparative Statics of Equilibrium Points	Rabah Amir*, David Rietzke

249	Persuasion III	
	Information Greenhouse: Optimal Persuasion for Medical Test-Avoiders	Zhuo Chen*
	Information design in allocation with costly verification	Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu, Xiangqian Yang*
	Partial commitment to disclosure rule	Ye Jin*, Zhen Zhou

344	Matching II	
	Games under the Tiered Deferred Acceptance Mechanism	Jiarui Xie*
	Strategic Post-exam Preference Submission in the School Choice Game	Vladimir Mazalov, Artem Sedakov*, Jaimie W. Lien, Jie Zheng
	The Equilibrium-Value Convergence for the Multiple-Partners Game	Chaoran Sun*, Chenghong Luo, David Perez-Castrillo

345	Search	
	Contracting of Search Order	Xiaoyu Chen*, Yibo Lian
	Priority Search with Outside Options	Jaehong Kim, Mengling Li*, Menghan Xu
	Search prominence with costly product returns	Daniel Z. Li, Sanxi Li, Jun Yu, Mingsheng Zhang*

429	Networks V	
	Why are there six degrees of separation in a social network?	Ivan Samoylenko*, David Aleja, Eva Primo, ..., Stefano Boccaletti
	Competition for Linkages with Public Goods Contribution	Guopeng Li*, Wei Zhao
	A Model of Endogenous Group Membership, Social Capital, and Economic Mobility	Matthew Jackson*, Raj Chetty

6. Aug. 21 9:00 - 10:30

131	Auctions II	
	Optimal Security Design for Risk-Averse Investors	Alex Gershkov, Benny Moldovanu, Philipp Strack, Mengxi Zhang*
	Strategic Budget Selection in a Competitive Autobidding World	Yiding Feng*, Brendan Lucier, Aleksandrs Slivkins
	A Budget-Balanced Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities with Identity-Dependent Externalities	Younghwan In*, Yunkyeong Seo
	Optimal design of auction with linear contract under double moral hazard	Dazhong Wang, Ruqu Wang, Xinyi Xu*

132	Communication II	
	Multi-issue Strategic Information Transmission with Partial Attention	Yibin Li*
	The rating inflation game	Yan Long*
	Information Disclosure in Experts' Market with Uncertain Diagnostic Accuracy	Lin Zhao*
	Inference from Selectively Disclosed Data	Ying Gao*

245	Contests II	
	Entrant-Optimal Learning in A Contest Game	Shuo Xu*, Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng
	General Lotto solvable cases of the Colonel Blotto game	Marcin Dziubiński*
	Optimal Tree Contest Design and Winner-Take-All	Qian Jiao*, Zhonghong Kuang, Yiran Liu, Yang Yu
	Contesting fake news	Daniel Rehsmann, Béatrice Roussillon, Paul Schweinzer*

246	Contracts II	
	Detrimental Incentive Mechanisms in Dynamic Principal-Agent Relationships	Tom Rauber*, Philipp Weinschenk
	Vertical contracting and information spillover in Cournot competition	Jihwan Do, Nicolas Riquelme*
	Enforceability v.s. Flexibility: Incomplete Contract with Litigation Cost	Jingmin Huang*, Sanxi Li, Tong Wang, Jianye Yan
	Adverse Selection and Income Inequality	Yaping Wu, Shenghao Zhu*

249	Cooperative Games II	
	Axiomatization by Individual Monotonicity: Weighted Surplus Sharing and Shifted Proportional Division	Yukihiko Funaki*, Yukio Koriyama
	Equilibrium coalition structures in symmetric three-player games	Chen Qu*, Jingyi Shen
	On Entrance of a New Agent to a Market	Martin Černý*
	The Shapley Value and the Nucleolus of a Two-Sided Platform Game	Jinglei Huang*, Danxia Xie

344	Combinatorial Games and Potential Games	
	The Game of Cops and Robbers on Digraphs	Shravan Luckraz*, Gafurjan Ibragimov
	Bidding Partizan Subtrction Games	Ravi Kant Rai*, Urban Larsson, Makoto Yokoo
	Near Gradient Evolution	Omer Edhan, Ziv Hellman*
	Beyond Global Maximizers: Unveiling the Full Potential of Potential Games	Zhigang Cao*, Zhibin Tan, Jinchuan Zhou

345	Networks VI	
	Network-Based Peer Monitoring Design	Yangbo Song*, Zhuoran Lu
	Constrained Pricing in Social Networks	Chengqing Li*, Junjie Zhou
	Comparing with neighbors: the network determinants of involution and hierarchical solidification	Shenghao Sun*, Yiqing Xing, Chen Cheng, Wenjun Mei
	Selling Network Information	Renkun Yang, Jianyu Xu*

429	Incomplete Information Industrial Organization I	
	Optimal Indirect Regulation of Externalities	Zi Yang Kang*
	Efficient Auction Design with Externalities	Bing Liu, Simon Loertscher*
	Optimal Hotelling Auctions	Simon Loertscher, Ellen Muir*
	Nested Bundling	Frank Yang*

7. Aug. 21 13:30 - 14:40

131	Contests III	
	Information Design in Sequential All-Pay Auction Contests	Chao Wu*, Jie Zheng
	Prize Allocation Equilibrium in Team Contests	Jingfeng Lu, Yiyao Zhu*
	Dynamic Resource Allocation in Tullock Tug-of-war	Haochen Xie*, Jie Zheng

132	Persuasion IV	
	Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders	Zhicheng Du*, Wei Tang, Zihe Wang, Shuo Zhang
	Persuasion and Norm Persistence	Francesca Chiaradia*
	Public Persuasion in Elections: Single-Crossing Property and the Optimality of Interval Revelation	Junze Sun*, Arthur Schram, Randolph Sloof

245	Computation I	
	Equilibria in Two-Stage Facility Location with Atomic Clients	Simon Krogmann*, Pascal Lenzner, A. Skopalik, M. Uetz, M.C. Vos
	Optimal Private Payoff Manipulation against Commitment in Extensive-Form Games	Yurong Chen*, Xiaotie Deng, Yuhao Li
	Predefined-Time Generalized Nash Equilibrium Seeking for Aggregative Games with Event-Triggered Communication	Jianing Chen*, Chuangyin Dang, Sitian Qin

246	Matching III	
	Continuous Time Random Matching: A General Model	Darrell Duffie, Lei Qiao*, Yeneng Sun
	Matching and Price Competition in Large Markets	Bingchao Huangfu*, Gagan Ghosh, Heng Liu
	Hierarchic matching with single peaked preferences and the formation of pyramidal organizations	Li Nie*

249	Mechanism Design IV	
	The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings	Gaoji Hu*
	Ex Post Strategy-proof Implementation	Qinggong Wu*, Tangren Feng
	Simple Mechanisms for Agents with Non-linear Utilities	Yiding Feng, Jason Hartline, Yingkai Li*

344	Industrial Organization VI	
	Exclusive Contracting and Discriminatory Pricing in Two-sided Markets	Haipeng Han*, Mingzhi Li, Jie Zheng
	Revealing Private Information in a Patent Race	Eugen Kovac*, Pavel Kocourek
	Endogenous Exclusive Contracts and Platforms' Dilemma	Feng Zhu*, Guopeng LI, Zhigang Cao

345	Incomplete Information Industrial Organization II	
	Ramsey Pricing Revisited	Simon Loertscher*, Ellen Muir
	Supply Chain Frictions	Ying-Ju Chen, Zhengqing Gui*, Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, Xiaojian Zhao
	Acceptance Deadline and Job Offer Deadline	Changying Li, Xin Zhao*

429	Experiments II	
	Selten's Horse: An experient on Sequential Rationality	Asha Sadanand*, Nikolaos Tsakas
	Type-Projection in Private Information Games	Miguel Costa-Gomes, Jiawen Li*, Marco Serena
	Self-serving fairness in competing allocation proposals: evidence from the laboratory	Jianing Chen*, Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng

8. Aug. 21 15:10 - 16:20

131	Contests IV	
	All-Pay Auctions with Affiliated Types and Values: Equilibria and Information Disclosure	Bo Chen,* Jingfeng Lu, Zijia Wang
	Restricting Entries to All-Pay Contests	Yanwei Sun*, Fupeng Sun, Chiwei Yan, Li Jin
	Monotone perfection	Wei He, Yeneng Sun, Hanping Xu*

132   Persuasion V

How Marketing Strategies Shape Price Competition	Daehong Min*, Heechun Kim, Hakki Lee
Sequential Price Discrimination in Selling Information Goods	Fynn Louis Närmann*, Manuel Förster
Persuading the persuaded: a continuation of Blackwell	Constantine Sorokin*, Eyal Winter

245   Learning III

Social Learning through Action-Signals	Wenji Xu*
Breaking Bad News	Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn*, Simon Board
Falsifiable Test Design in Coordination Games	Boli Xu*, Yingkai Li

246   Matching IV

Matching Through Agents	Ken Ho*, Jinyong Jeong
Proper Exclusion Right, Priority and Allocation of Positions	Yao Cheng*, Zaifu Yang, Jingsheng Yu
Stability and strategy-proofness formatching with interval constraints	Tsuyoshi Adachi*, Yuki Ishibashi

249   Networks VII

Strategies of Influence in Binary Star Networks: The Role of Indifferent Agents in Opinion Dynamics	Xiangyu Li, Yin Li*
A Dynamic Analysis of Criminal Networks	Luca Colombo, Paola Labrecciosa, Agnieszka Rusinowska*
The Network Banzhaf Value in Deterministic and Variable Network Situations	Loyimee Gogoi*, Surajit Borkotokey, Subhadip Chakrabarti, Rajnish Kumar

344   Industrial Organization VII

Platform Dominance and Across-Market Bundling	Xiongfei Dong*, Jiajia Cong
Self-Preferencing Across Markets	Muxin Li*
The sleeper effect of comparative advertising in oligopolistic market	Rabah Amir, Dominika Machowska*, Andrzej Nowakowski

345   Industrial Organization VIII

Information Gathering on Multi-Attribute Products	Jia He, Weixuan Zhou*
Platform Persuasion	Yao Li*, Jiang Wei, Danxia Xie
Endogenous Information Acquisition in a Supply Chain	Lining Han, Shiping Lang, Xiaoxi Li*

429   Mechanism Design V

| Redesign Incentives in Proof-of-Stake Ethereum: An Interdisciplinary Approach of Reinforcement Learning and Mechanism Design | Xinyu Tian*, Zesen Zhuang, Luyao Zhang |
| Trustworthy Cooperation in Non-cooperative Evolutionary Game | Xinyu Tian, Gary Charness, Luyao Zhang* |

9. Aug. 22 9:00 - 10:30

131   Persuasion VI

Private Test and Verifiable Disclosure	Yichuan Lou*
Diversity, Disagreement, and Information Aggregation	Xienan Cheng*, Tilman Börgers
Duplicity Games: proactive and strategic incentive design for insider threat mitigation	Linan Huang, Quanyan Zhu*
Certification Design with Outside Option	Ting Pei*, Bin Chen

10. Aug. 22 13:30 - 15:00

131   Assignment II

A computational approach to the comparison of fair division algorithms involving money transfers	Dhivya Anand Kumar*, Hervé Moulin
Utility distortion in claims problems	Bas Dietzenbacher*, William Thomson
A new axiomatization of the broadcasting problem	Marcus Franz Konrad Pisch*
Efficient and fair trading mechanisms for market design environments	JIngsheng Yu, Jun Zhang*

132   Communication III

Counterintelligence and Its Effects in Strategic Interactions with Conflict of Interest	Tao Wang*
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