

政治经济学（研究生）课程大纲

授课教师：席天扬

北京大学国家发展研究院

2017年秋季

1 基本信息

常规时间：周四，9AM - 12 PM

具体上课时间：9/14, 9/21, 9/28, 10/26, 11/2, 11/9, 11/16, 11/23, 11/30, 12/7, 12/14, 12/21

（注意：10月12, 19日两次课程因工作日程需要调换，具体时间地点第一周课后通知）

地点：国家发展研究院万众楼第二教室

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教师面谈时间：电子邮件预约

2 课程介绍

政治经济学是研究人类社会的博弈规则和演进规律的学科领域。在政治经济学中，研究主题往往并不限于一个政策或制度好不好，而是该政策和制度为什么会出现？为什么一些看似无效率的、不合理的制度或者政策会长期存在？本课程的目标，在于通过对政治经济学的重要和前沿文献的研讨，向大家介绍政治经济学的思考框架和分析方法，建立对于前沿研究课题的初步认知，并探索初步的研究选题和设计能力。本课程将会探讨政治治理中的基本问题，例如问责、分权、民主制度的功能等，同时也大量涵盖与转型中的中国密切相关的问题，例如科层结构、官僚体制、腐败与国家能力等。本课程要求选课人具备英文学术文献的阅读能力，并且具有相当于研究生阶段的微观经济学、博弈论和微观计量的基础知识。

3 考核要求和办法

本课程以授课为主，在后半学期会穿插学生报告研究设计或论文展示。每周的主题对应两

至三篇必读文献，要求必须在上课之前完成。同时鼓励学生尽可能多地从“相关文献”中选择自己感兴趣的论文进行阅读并在上课中讨论。本课程的考核要求为：课堂展示（每人一次）占总成绩的30%，课程论文占总成绩的70%。课程论文可以采用三种形式：原创性的研究论文、研究设计(research proposal)、和对本课程讨论过的某一周课题的研究性综述。课程论文需要在10月30日前提交初稿，1月30日前提交终稿。

4 课程安排

第一讲，导论：政治经济学的研究任务、对象和方法

必读文献：Gourevitch (2008); Barzel (2003)

第二讲，激励与选拔 (Incentive and Selection)：理解组织绩效的基本框架

组织何以可能？作为思考组织绩效基本框架的委托—代理问题；道德风险和逆向选择；任期和绩效；用什么手段来激励人？政治企业家（political entrepreneur）的内部市场；筛选、声誉和信号模型；标尺竞争；机会主义行为；激励和选拔的两难；选拔能力还是政策偏好？政治企业家的自选择问题；以政治为志业意味着什么？选拔原则的演化。

必读文献：Barro (1973); Maskin and Tirole (2004); Xu (2011)

相关文献：Alt et al. (2011) Anderson (2007); Ashworth and De Mesquita (2014); Ashworth (2012); Baskaran et al. (2015); Benton (2005); Berganza (2000); Besley and Case (1995); Besley and Burgess (2002); Brender and Drazen (2008); Carey (1994); Carlson (2015); Caselli and Morelli (2004); Dal Bó and Rossi (2011); Gagliarducci and Nannicini (2013); Gordon and Huber (2007); Healy and Malhotra (2009); Healy and Malhotra (2013); Joanis (2014); Li and Zhou (2005); Maskin et al. (2000); Mattozzi and Merlo (2008); Messner and Polborn (2004); Montalvo (2011); Shi and Xi (2017); Xi et al. (2016); Yao and Zhang (2015)

中文文献：钱穆（2012）

第三讲，政治博弈的顶层逻辑 (Logic of Political Survival)：从统治者的角度看

组织的目标是什么？组织的宽度和深度；作为终极组织形式的国家；对政体的定义；民主制下的政治责任；一个最低限度的民主理论（从熊彼特到普沃斯基）；威权政体的政治逻辑；威权责任论；制胜联盟论；寡头代理论；制度均衡论；可信承诺问题；忠诚和能力的两难；派系政治；为什么有派系？为什么有政党？维持忠诚和团结是一切组织的首要目标；代际冲突；意识形态和公民精神；

必读文献：Fearon (2011); Myerson (2015)

相关文献：Acemoglu (2008); Acemoglu et al. (2010); Barros (2002); Bermeo (1992); Bidner and Francois (2013); Bidner et al. (2014); Boix and Svulik (2013); Bruce et al. (2003); Che et al. (2013); Che et al. (2014); Dahl (1992); Egorov and Sonin (2011); Francois et al. (2014); Gehlbach and Keefer (2011); Kalyvas (2000); Myerson (2008); Persico et al. (2011); Persico et al. (2011); Gramsci (1971); Przeworski (1999); Reuter and Robertson (2012); Rundlett and Svulik (2016); Shih et al. (2012); Sudduth (2015)

第四讲，分权和集权：信息、代理成本和政治竞争（Decentralization and Centralization）

组织的边界；分散的信息和知识；代理成本；集权和授权的悖论；对大饥荒的理论解释；分权和组织创新；竞争与合谋；政策的溢出效应；马基雅维利式的分权理论。

必读文献：Aghion and Tirole (1997); Myerson (2015); Callander and Harstad (2015)

相关文献：Cai and Treisman (2006); Cai et al. (2009); Che et al. (2017); de Figueiredo Jr and Weingast (2005); Fan et al. (2016); Huang et al. (2017); Jia and Nie (2017); Kung and Chen (2011); Li et al. (2017); Li and Yang (2005); Meng et al. (2015); Montinola et al. (1995); Rithmire (2014); Shi and Xi (2017)

中文文献：许倬云（2005），瞿同祖(2015)

第五讲，大国兴衰：地理，疆域，知识，和组织架构（Geography, Size, Knowledge, and Organization Form）

疆域和国家能力；疆域的地理因素；为什么宋、明的疆域比清朝小；战争与国家能力；知识和科层分布；扁平化与垂直的组织；行政区划；组织和知识生产

必读文献：Alesina and Spolaore (1997); Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006)

相关文献：Aghion and Tirole (1995); Argyles and Silverman (2004); Baker et al. (1999); Gennaioli and Voth (2015); Grossman et al. (2017); Ko et al. (2014); Ma and Rubin (2017); Markevich and Zhuravskaya (2011); Maskin et al. (2000); Qian et al. (2006); Stasavage (2014); Williamson (1983)

中文文献：周振鹤（2013）

第六讲，贤能体制与社会流动性（Meritocracy and Social Mobility）

怎么定义贤能；为什么选贤任能；是否应该以选贤任能作为社会正义的目标；什么样的体制最宜于选贤任能；开放与封闭的体制；代际问题；贤能体制与社会流动；政治网络与选拔；选贤任能与政治代表的关系。

必读文献：Dal Bó et al. (2016); Benabou (2000)

相关文献: Besley et al. (2017); Chetty et al. (2014); Dal Bó et al. (2009); Holthausen and Tsoulouhas (2008); Pettit (2015); Querubin et al. (2016); Xi (2017); Xu (2017)

中文文献: 贝淡宁 (2013), 何怀宏 (1998)

第七讲, 政治网络、资源和声誉: 理解官僚体制的逻辑 (Political Network, Resource, and Reputation)

怎么定义官僚阶层和官僚制度; 官僚制度的基本功能; 政治网络和联盟; 政治联系和资源分配; 是利益还是信念; 官僚的目标函数; 授权模型; 官僚集团的演化; 政党体制和官僚体制; 官僚体制化和经济增长

必读文献: Gailmard and Patty (2007); Novaes and Zingales (2004)

相关文献: Alesina and Tabellini (2007); Besley and Coate (2003); Carpenter (2004); Choi et al. (2010); Ennsner-Jedenastik (2015); Frantz and Ezrow (2009); Gehlbach and Simpser (2015); Geys et al. (2017); Huang (1994); Iyer and Mani (2012); Konisky (2007); Krause and Bowman (2005); Lim (2013); Markus (2016); Matsusaka (2009); Prendergast (2007); Reuter and Robertson (2012); Ting (2002); Weingast and Moran (1983)

中文文献: 王亚南(1981); 阎步克(2001)

第八讲, 腐败和国家能力 (Corruption and State Capacity)

怎么定义腐败; 腐败来自国家失败? ; 非国家行为中的腐败; 市场失灵和国家失败; 国家能力; 非正式经济; 腐败的历史比较; 政商关系; 腐败和发展的关系; 是否所有腐败问题都可以通过经济激励解决?; 民主制度能够减少腐败吗? 非民主制度下有哪些制度有助于减少腐败?

必读文献: Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006); Shi et al. (2017); Svensson (2005)

相关文献: Arias (2013); Banerjee (1997); Choi and Thum (2005); Drugov (2010); Fisman and Wang (2014); Golden and Chang (2001); Hollyer and Wantchekon (2014); Johnson et al. (1997); Justesen and Bjørnskov (2014); Kolstad and Wiig (2016); Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman (2005); La Porta and Shleifer (2008); Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2006); Lu and Lorentzen (2016); Ma and Rubin (2017); Mauro (1995); Olken and Singhal (2011); Popa (2015); Treisman (2007); Wallis et al. (2006)

中文文献: 郝煜, 刘正铨(2017)

第九讲, 改革的政治经济学 (Political Economy of Reform)

改革者的动机；利益还是观念；政党政治；政治制度；思潮影响；政治领袖的作用；改革的空间效应；改革博弈

必读文献：Jingheng et al. (2017); Jha (2015)

相关文献：Acemoglu (2003); Aidt and Franck (2015); ALESINA and DRAZEN (1991); Alesina et al. (1998); Belenzon and Schankerman (2013); Buera et al. (2011); Haggard et al. (1994); Hellman (1998); Lau et al. (2000); Rodrik (2014); Stokes (1996)

中文文献：林毅夫，蔡昉，李周(2003)

第十讲，冲突的政治经济学 (Political Economy of Conflicts)

冲突的类型；社会阶层说；文明冲突说；国家规制说；社会冲突模型的微观基础；机会成本和风险；资源分配；种族对立和极化；网络与冲突；冲突与经济发展。

必读文献：Dell (2015); Dube and Vargas (2013)

相关文献：Angrist and Kugler (2008); Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014); Esteban and Ray (2008); Fearon and Laitin (2003); Hendrix (2010); Huntington (1997); Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005)

第十一讲，政治体制、经济绩效的比较研究 (Comparative Institutions and Economic Performance)

为什么要对体制分类；单一制和联邦制；议会制和总统制；多数决和比例代表；一党制和多党制；比较制度和经济政策；权力分享体制。

必读文献：Francois et al. (2015); Persson et al. (2000)

相关文献：Acemoglu et al. (2013); Dixit et al. (2000); Fjelde and Höglund (2016); Foweraker and Landman (2002); Gervasoni (2010); Hayo and Voigt (2010); Helmke (2010); McGann (2004); Persson et al. (2003); Persson and Tabellini (2004); Robinson and Torvik (2016); Ticchi and Vindigni (2010)

第十二讲，收入和财富分配的政治经济学 (Political Economy of Distribution)

政党竞争和再分配；利益集团政治；从Stigler, Becker 到Rogowski；要素收入比的变化；城市和财富分配；代际流动

必读文献：Roemer (1999); Piketty and Zucman (2014)

相关文献：Bonica et al. (2013); Checchi et al. (1999); Chetty et al. (2014); Corneo and Grüner (2000); Corneo and Grüner (2002); Dutt and Mitra (2005); Epple and Romer (1991);

Georgiadis and Manning (2012) Karabarbounis and Neiman (2013); Elsby et al. (2013); Jensen et al. (2017); Kim (2017); Lindqvist and Östling (2013); Lupu and Pontusson (2011); Piketty (1995); Piketty and Zucman (2014); Rogowski (1987); Shayo (2009)

第十三讲，制度变迁 (Institutional Change)

作为均衡的制度；马克思主义的制度变迁理论；制度变迁的快与慢；技术和制度变迁；知识传播和制度变迁；正式成文的制度和实际生效的制度；基于效率原则的引导；科斯定理。

必读文献：Acemoglu and Jackson (2014); Gilley (2008)

相关文献：Baturu (2010); Capoccia and Kelemen (2007); Cox (2017); De Mesquita and Smith (2009); Greif and Laitin (2004); Jha (2013); Przeworski et al. (2015)

第十四讲，文化、惯例和非正式制度 (Culture, Norm, and Informal Institutions)

文化何以重要；惯例和习俗；惯例对日常选择的影响；传统社会治理模式；文化维系社群团结；文化的持存；文化与人力资本。

必读文献：Alesina et al. (2015); Algan et al. (2016)

相关文献：Becker et al. (2016); Carvalho (2016); Fisman et al. (2017)

5 英文参考文献

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